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Abstract
This paper presents a stock-ﬂow consistent macroeconomic model in which ﬁnancial fragility in ﬁrm and household sectors evolves endogenously through
the interaction between real and ﬁnancial sectors. Changes in ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial practices produce long waves. The Hopf bifurcation theorem is
applied to clarify the conditions for the existence of limit cycles, and simulations illustrate stable limit cycles. The long waves are characterized by periodic
economic crises following long expansions. Short cycles, generated by the interaction between eﬀective demand and labor market dynamics, ﬂuctuate around
the long waves.
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1. Introduction
Financial crisis hit the U.S and world economy in 2008. Giant ﬁnancial
institutions have collapsed. Stock markets have tumbled, and exchange rates are
in turmoil. Governments and central banks around the world have responded
by implementing bailout plans for troubled ﬁnancial institutions and cutting
interest rates to contain the ﬁnancial panic, and expansionary ﬁscal packages are
being pushed through to prop up aggregate demand. Hyman Minsky’s Financial
Instability Hypothesis oﬀers an interesting perspective on these developments,
1 I would like to thank Peter Skott for his support. I greatly beneﬁted from his guidance,
suggestions, and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I also would like to thank James
Crotty, James Heintz, and participants in UMASS-New School Graduate Workshop 2008 for
their comments. Any errors remain mine. Email: sryoo@econs.umass.edu
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which came after a long period of ﬁnancial deregulation, rapid securitization
and the development of a range of new ﬁnancial instruments and markets.2
According to Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis, a capitalist economy
cannot lead to a sustained full employment equilibrium and serious business
cycles are unavoidable due to the unstable nature of the interaction between investment and ﬁnance (Minsky, 1986, 173). An initially robust ﬁnancial system
is endogenously turned into a fragile system as a prolonged period of good years
induces ﬁrms and bankers to take riskier ﬁnancial practices. During expansions, an investment boom generates a proﬁt boom but this induces investors
and banks to adopt more speculative ﬁnancial arrangements. This is typically
reﬂected in rising debt ﬁnance, which eventually turns out to be unsustainable
because the rising debt changes cash ﬂow relations and leads to various types
of ﬁnancial distress. Minsky suggests that this kind of endogenous change in
ﬁnancial fragility can generate debt-driven long expansions followed by deep
depressions (Minsky 1964, 1995). In Minsky’s theory of long waves, short cycles
ﬂuctuate around the long waves produced by endogenous changes in ﬁnancial
structure. Thus, the distinction between short cycles and long waves is an important characteristic of Minsky’s cycle theory.
In spite of diﬃculties inherent in the formalization of Minsky’s theories,
Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis has inspired a number of researchers to
model the dynamic interaction between real and ﬁnancial sectors. Taylor and
O’Connell (1985), Foley (1986), Semmler (1987), Jarsulic (1989), Delli Gatti and
Gallegati (1990), Skott (1994), Dutt (1995), Keen (1995) and Flaschel, Franke
and Semmler (1998, Ch.12) are early contributions. Recent studies include
Setterﬁeld (2004), Nasica and Raybaut (2005), Lima and Meirelles (2007), and
Fazzari et al. (2008).
This paper presents a stock-ﬂow consistent model where ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial practices evolve endogenously through the interaction between
real and ﬁnancial sectors. The interaction between changes in ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial practices produces long waves. The resulting long waves are
characterized by periodic economic crises following long expansions. Short cycles, generated by the interaction between eﬀective demand and labor market
dynamics, ﬂuctuate around the long waves.
Compared to the previous literature, this paper has three distinct features:
2 Wray (2008), Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) and Crotty (2008), among others, provide perspectives on how shaky are the foundations of these ‘sophisticated’ developments in ﬁnancial
markets.
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First, the model in this paper is stock-ﬂow consistent.3 Financial stocks
are explicitly introduced and their implications for income and ﬁnancial ﬂows
are carefully modeled. In particular, unlike the previous studies listed above,
capital gains from holding stocks are not assumed away and enter the deﬁnition
of the rate of return on equity.4 The rate of return on equity deﬁned in this
way provides a basis of households’ portfolio decision. Firms’ and households’
ﬁnancial decisions jointly determine stock prices and the rate of return on equity
in equilibrium. Thus, stock markets receive a careful treatment in this model
and play a central role in producing cycles.
Second, this paper pays attention to both ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial
decisions. Minsky’s own account of ﬁnancial instability tends to privilege the
ﬁrm sector as a source of fragility.5 Most previous studies follow this tradition
and tend to neglect the role of households’ ﬁnancial decisions in creating instability and cycles. Some of the previous studies, including Taylor and O’Connell
(1985), Delli Gatti and Gallegati (1990), and Flaschel, Franke and Semmler
(1998, Ch.12), do not suﬀer from this kind of limitation but analyze households’ portfolio decision as well. However, their neglect of the role of capital
gains in households’ portfolio decision makes it diﬃcult to analyze the implication of households’ ﬁnancial decisions and stock market behavior for instability
and cycles. In contrast to these models, the model in this paper analyzes both
households’ and ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial decisions. Capital gains and stock markets are
considered explicitly in a stock-ﬂow consistent framework. The interactions between households and ﬁrms turn out to be critical to the behavior of the system.
The model consists of two subsystems: ﬁrms’ debt dynamics and households’
portfolio dynamics. One interesting result of our analysis is that two stable
subsystems can be combined to produce instability and cycles in the whole system (See section 3). Thus, the resulting instability and cycles are genuinely
attributed to the interaction between sectors rather than characteristics of one
particular sector.
Lastly, existing Minskian models do not distinguish long waves from short
3 See Skott (1981), Godley and Cripps (1983) and Taylor (1985) for early introductions of
explicit stock-ﬂow relations in a post-Keynesian / structuralist context. Simulation exercises
based on the stock-ﬂow consistent framework have been ﬂourishing since Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2).
4 Empirically, the movements of capital gains explain most of cyclical movements of the
rate of return on equity.
5 Minsky’s neglect of the household sector is explained by his observation that “[H]ousehold
debt-ﬁnancing of consumption is almost always hedge ﬁnancing.” (1982, p. 32) This position,
however, has been challenged by some Minskian explanations of the sub-prime mortgage crisis.
(e.g. Wray(2008) and Kregel (2008))
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cycles and the periodicity of cycles in those models is ambiguous. My model is
explicit in this matter. It produces two distinct cycles: long waves and short
cycles. Long waves are produced by the interaction between ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial decisions, while short cycles are generated by the interaction
between eﬀective demand and labor market dynamics. In this framework, Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis is seen as a basis of long waves.6 To the
best of my knowledge, my model is the ﬁrst to integrate an analysis of Minskian
long waves with that of short cycles.
The analysis of the implications of ﬁnancial behavior for instability and cycles in this paper complements previous studies on ﬁnancialization and ﬁnanceled growth in Skott and Ryoo (2008) where the emphasis is on the eﬀects of
changes in ﬁnancial behavior on long-run steady growth path with little attention to questions of stability and ﬂuctuations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up a stock-ﬂow
consistent model. Section 3 analyzes how the interaction between ﬁrms’ and
households’ ﬁnancial practices produces long waves. Section 4 brieﬂy introduces
a model of short cycles into the current context. Section 5 combines our model of
long waves with the short-cycle model and provides simulation results. Section
6, ﬁnally, oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2. Model
This section presents a model. Firms make decisions concerning accumulation, ﬁnancing, and pricing/output; households make consumption and portfolio
decisions; banks accept deposits and make loans. It is assumed that there are
only two types of ﬁnancial assets - equity and bank deposits - and banks are the
only ﬁnancial institution. It is assumed that the available labor force grows at
a constant rate7 and long run growth is constrained by the availability of labor.
6 Minsky’s two papers (Minsky, 1964, 1995) provide a strong support for this view. In these
two papers, Minsky argues that there exists a mechanism in a capitalist economy that generates a ‘long swing’: the “mechanism which has generated the long swings centers around the
cumulative changes in ﬁnancial variables that take place over the long-swing expansions and
contractions.” (Minsky, 1964). “The more severe depressions of history occur after a period
of good economic performance, with only minor cycles disturbing a generally expanding economy.”(Minsky, 1995, p.85) During this long expansion, an initially robust ﬁnancial structure
is transformed to a fragile structure.
7 We assume that there is no technical progress but the model can easily accommodate
Harrod neutral technical progress

4

2.1. Firms
2.1.1. The ﬁnance constraint
Firms have three sources of funds in our framework: proﬁts, new issue of
equity and debt ﬁnance. Using these funds, ﬁrms make investments in real
capital, pay out dividends and make interest payments. Algebraically,
pI + Div + iM = Π + v Ṅ + Ṁ

(1)

where I, Π, Div, M , and N are real gross investment, gross proﬁts, dividends,
bank loans and the number of shares, respectively. Bank loans carry the nominal
interest rate (i). p represents the price of investment goods as well as the general
price of output in this one-sector model. All shares are assumed to have the
same price v.8
We assume that ﬁrms’ dividend payout is determined as a constant fraction
of proﬁts net of depreciation and real interest payments. The dividend payout
rate is denoted as 1 − sf and, consequently, sf represents ﬁrms’ retention rate.
Thus, we have
Div = (1 − sf )(Π − δpK − rM )
(2)
where K and δ are real capital stock and the rate of depreciation of real capital.
r represents the real interest rate, r = i− p̂.9 Lavoie and Godley (2001-2002) and
Dos Santos and Zezza (2007), among others, use the speciﬁcation (2) regarding
ﬁrms’ retention policy.
New equity issue can be represented by the growth of the number of shares
(N̂ ) or by the share of investment ﬁnanced by new issues denoted as x. Skott
(1989) and Foley and Taylor (2004) use the former and Lavoie and Godley
(2001-2002) the latter. Two measures, however, are related to each other in the
following manner.
vN N̂ = xpI
(3)
Substituting (2) into (1), we get
pI − δpK = sf (Π − δpK − rM ) + vN N̂ + M (M̂ − p̂)

(4)

Scaling by the value of capital stock (pK), we have
K̂ ≡ g = sf (πuσ − δ − rm) + x(g + δ) + ṁ + gm
8A

(5)

dot over a variable refers to a time derivative (ẏ = dy/dt).
hat over a variable is used to denote a growth rate of the variable, for instance, ŷ =
(1/y)(dy/dt)
9A
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Π
where π, u, and m is the proﬁt share (π ≡ pY
), the utilization rate (u ≡ YYF ,
M
YF is full capacity output) and the debt-capital ratio (m ≡ pK
). The technical
YF
output/capital ratio, σ (≡ K ), is assumed to be ﬁxed. δ is the depreciation
rate. Equation (5) has a straightforward interpretation: ﬁrms’ investment (g)
is ﬁnanced by three sources: retained earnings, sf (πuσ − δ − rm), new equity
issue, x(g + δ) and bank loans, ṁ + gm. Given this ﬁnance constraint, ﬁrms’
ﬁnancial behavior is characterized by sf , x (or N̂ ) and m. Most theories treat
the rates of ﬁrms’ retention and equity issue as parameters and debt ﬁnance
as an accommodating variable (Skott 1989, Lavoie and Godley 2001-2002 and
Dos Santos and Zezza 2007). This paper assumes that the retention rate (sf ) is
exogenous as in the above literature but both the rate of equity issue (x or N̂ )
and the leverage ratio m are endogenous. However, our way of treating equity
ﬁnance and debt ﬁnance is not symmetric.
Debt ﬁnance evolves through endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ and banks’ ﬁnancial practices which are directly inﬂuenced by the relationship between ﬁrms’
proﬁtability and leverage ratio (see section 2.1.2 below). With debt ﬁnance determined in this way, equity ﬁnance (x) serves as a buﬀer in the sense that once
the other sources of ﬁnance − the retention and debt ﬁnance policies − and
investment plans are determined, equity issues ﬁll the gap between the funds
needed for the investment plans and the funds available from retained earnings
and bank loans. In this regard, equity ﬁnance is seen as a pure residual of ﬁrms’
ﬁnancing constraint. Formally, for a given set of parameters sf , σ, δ and r, the
trajectories of endogenous variables g, π, u, m and ṁ determine the required
ratio of equity ﬁnance to gross investment:

x=

g − sf (πuσ − δ − rm) − ṁ − gm
g+δ

(6)

The treatment of equity ﬁnance as a residual may appear to be unsatisfactory
from a point of view that emphasizes substantial diﬃculty involved in raising
capital in equity markets compared to the other methods of ﬁnance. However,
as Figure 1 shows, the degree of ﬂexibility in issuing equities was historically
very large. This was even more prominent when there were signiﬁcant stock
buybacks, i.e. the rate of net issue of equity was negative (x < 0). For instance,
the share of ﬁxed investment ﬁnanced by equity issues was nearly zero in 1982
but reached -42% in 1985. It then bounced back to a positive rate, 4.3% in
1991, and hit the historical low, -71.5% in 2007.
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Figure 1: The Ratio of Net Issues of Equities to Fixed Investment (1952-2007)

Notes: Net issues of nonﬁnancial corporate equities divided by nonfarm nonﬁnancial
corporate (gross) ﬁxed investment
Sources:Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Table
F.213 and Table F.102. Author’s calculation.

2.1.2. Endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ liability structure
Endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ liability structure, which are captured by
changes in ﬁrms’ debt-capital ratio (m), are central in this paper, and a Minskian perspective suggests that the debt-capital ratio evolves according to sustained changes in ﬁrms’ proﬁtability relative to their payment obligations on
debt. Changes in proﬁtability that are perceived as highly temporary have only
limited eﬀects on desired leverage. I, therefore, distinguish cyclical movements
in proﬁtability from the trend in average proﬁtability and assume that changes
in liability structure are determined as the trend of proﬁtability.10
The perception of strong proﬁtability relative to payment commitments during good years, Minsky argues, induces bankers and businessmen to adopt riskier
ﬁnancial practices which typically results in increases in the leverage ratio. Following Minsky’s idea (Minsky, 1982, 1986), I assume that changes in the ratio
of proﬁt to debt service commitments drive changes in the debt structure. Formally,
(ρ )
T
ṁ = τ
; τ ′ (·) > 0
(7)
rm
where ρT represents the trend rate of proﬁt11 and τ is an increasing function.
During a period of good years when the level of proﬁt is suﬃciently high com10 See
11 A

section 3.1 for more discussion.
deﬁnition of the trend rate of proﬁt will be provided in section 3.
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pared to interest payment obligations, ﬁrms’ and bankers’ optimism, reinforced
by their success, tends to make them adopt riskier ﬁnancial arrangements which
involve higher leverage ratios. Moreover, a high proﬁt level compared to debt
servicing is typically associated with a low probability of default which helps
bankers maintain their optimism. The opposite is true when the ratio of proﬁt to
interest payments is low. Firms’ failure to repay debt obligations - defaults and
bankruptcies in the ﬁrm sector - put ﬁnancial institutions linked to those ﬁrms
in trouble as well. This situation, which is often manifested in a system-wide
credit crunch, tends to force ﬁrms and bankers to reduce ﬁrms’ indebtedness.
2.1.3. Accumulation
In general, capital accumulation is aﬀected by several factors including profitability, utilization, Tobin’s q, the level of internal cash ﬂows, the real interest
rates and the debt ratio, but there is no consensus among theorists concerning
the sensitivity of ﬁrms’ accumulation behavior to changes in the various arguments. This paper follows a Harrodian perspective in which capacity utilization
has foremost importance in ﬁrms’ accumulation behavior (Harrod, 1939). The
perspective assumes that ﬁrms have a desired rate of utilization. In the short
run, the actual rate of utilization may deviate from the desired rate since ﬁrms’
demand expectations are not always met and capital stocks slowly adjust. If
the actual rate exceeds the desired rate, ﬁrms will accelerate accumulation to
increase their productive capacity and if the actual rate is smaller than the desired rate, they will slow down accumulation to reduce the undesired reserve of
excess productive capacity. However, in the long run, it is not reasonable to assume that the actual rate can persistently deviate from the desired rate because
capital stocks can ﬂexibly adjust to maintain the desired rate. This perspective
naturally distinguishes the short-run accumulation function from the long-run
accumulation function.12
A simple version of the long-run accumulation function can be written as
u = u∗

(8)

where u∗ is an exogenously given desired rate of utilization. (8) represents the
idea that in the long run, the utilization rate must be at what ﬁrms want it to
be and capital accumulation is perfectly elastic so as to maintain the desired
rate. The strict exogeneity of the desired rate in (8) may exaggerate reality
but tries to capture mild variations of the utilization rate in the long-run. For
12 This

Harrodian perspective is elaborated in Skott (1989, 2008a, 2008b) in greater detail.
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(a) Capacity Utilization: Total Index

(b) Capacity Utilization: Manufacturing (SIC)
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Figure 2: Capacity Utilization. U.S (1948-2008)

Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization

instance, Figure 2 (a) and (b) plot the rate of capacity utilization in the U.S. for
the industrial sector and the manufacturing sector, respectively. The HodrickPrescott ﬁltered series (dotted lines) are added to capture the long-run variations
in the utilization rate. The ﬁgures show that the degree of capacity utilization
is subject to signiﬁcant short-run variations but exhibits only mild variations
around 80% in the long-run.
In this paper, we use the long run accumulation function (8) to analyze long
waves: as long as we are interested in cycles over a fairly long period of time,
the assumption that the actual utilization rate is on average at the desired rate
is a reasonable approximation.
For the analysis of short cycles, however, the accumulation function (8)
cannot be an appropriate speciﬁcation because the deviation of the actual from
the desired rate normally occurs in the short run. Thus, we will use the following
speciﬁcation (9) to describe accumulation behavior during a course of short
cycles in section 4.
K̂ ≡ g = ϕ(u); ϕ′ (u) ≫ 0, ϕ(u∗ ) = n

(9)

The strong positive eﬀect of utilization on accumulation in (9) embodies the
Harrodian accelerator principle and the function ϕ is conﬁgured so that the
desired rate of utilization is consistent with steady growth at a natural rate.13
13 The speciﬁcation (9) is clearly an oversimpliﬁcation since it leaves out other determinants
of investment. For instance, it does not capture the direct impact of ﬁnancial variables such
as cash ﬂow and asset prices which are highly emphasized by Minsky (1975, 1982, 1986) and
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2.2. Banks
In the model, banks’ active role in shaping ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structure is represented by equation (7) which reﬂects both ﬁrms’ and banks’ behavior. For a
given proﬁt-interest ratio, equation (7) determines the trajectory of the debtcapital ratio m. At any moment, the amount of loans supplied to ﬁrms will
be M = mpK. I assume that neither households nor ﬁrms hold cash, the loan
and deposit rates are equal and there are no costs involved in banking. With
these assumptions, the amount of loans to the ﬁrm sector must equal the total
deposits of the household sector.
M = MH

(10)

where M H represents households’ deposit holdings.
Banks set the nominal interest rate i, which is typically aﬀected by inﬂation.
To simplify the analysis, I assume that banks eﬀectively control the real interest
rate r.
2.3. Households
Households receive wage income, dividends in return for their stock holdings
and interest income. Thus, household real disposable income denoted as Y H is
H
.
given as: Y H = W +Div+rM
p
Households hold stocks and deposits and household wealth is denoted as
H
H
N W H , where N W H = vN p+M . Based on their income and wealth, households make consumption and portfolio decisions. We adopt a conventional speciﬁcation of consumption function. (e.g. Ando and Modigliani, 1963)
C = C(Y H , N W H ); CY H > 0 , CN W H > 0

(11)

For simpliﬁcation, we assume that the function takes a linear form. We then
have, after normalizing by capital stock and simple manipulations,
C
= c1 [uσ − sf (πuσ − δ − rm)] + c2 q
K

(12)

where uσ − sf (πuσ − δ − rm) is household income scaled by capital stock and
Tobin’s q captures household wealth. c1 and c2 are household propensities to
consume out of income and wealth.
Tobin (1969), as well as current New Keynesian economics (Fazzari et al.(1988) and Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), among others). However, equation (9) can be easily extended
to accommodate the eﬀect of those variables without aﬀecting major results of this study.
In fact, the eﬀect of cash ﬂow and Tobin’s q on accumulation, it can be shown, reinforces
the utilization eﬀect on accumulation embodied in (9). The merit of simple speciﬁcation in
equation (9) is that it shows the underlying mechanisms in a transparent way.
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In addition to consumption/saving decisions, households make portfolio deH
cisions. We denote the equity-deposit ratio as α, where α ≡ vN
.
MH
I assume that the composition of households’ portfolio is aﬀected by their
views on stock market performance. Applying a Minskian hypothesis to household behavior, it is assumed that during good years, households tend to hold a
greater proportion of ﬁnancial assets in the form of riskier assets. In our twoasset framework, equity represents a risky asset and deposits a safe asset. Thus,
a rise in fragility during good years is captured by a rise in α. We introduce
a new variable z to represent the degree of households’ optimism about stock
markets. We can normalize the variable z so that z = 0 corresponds to the state
where households’ perception of tranquility is neutral and there is no change
in α. Given this framework, the evolution of α is determined by an increasing
function of z.
α̇ = ζ(z); ζ(0) = 0, ζ ′ (z) > 0
(13)
The next question is what determines households’ views about stock markets, z.
It is natural to assume that household portfolio decisions, the division of their
wealth into stocks and deposits, will be aﬀected by the diﬀerence between the
rates of return on stocks and deposits.
Our speciﬁcation of the process in which households form their views on
stock markets emphasizes historical elements in ﬁnancial markets. Thus, the
past trajectories of rates of return on assets as well as those of α matter in the
formation of z. As a crude approximation of this perception formation process,
the following exponential decay speciﬁcation is introduced:
∫ t
z=
exp [−λ(t − ν)]κ (rνe − r, αν ) dν
(14)
−∞

where re is the real rate of return on equity, κre ≡ ∂κ(r∂r−r,α)
> 0 and κα ≡
e
∂κ(r e −r,α)
e
< 0. In expression (14), κ (rν − r, αν ) represents the information
∂α
regarding the state of asset markets at time ν. The higher the rate of return on
equity relative to the deposit rate of interest, the more optimistic households’
view on stock markets becomes (κre > 0). However, other things equal, a
higher proportion of their ﬁnancial wealth in the form of stock holdings (high
α) tempers the desire of further increases in equity holdings, i.e. κα < 0.
Information on asset markets at diﬀerent times enters in the formation of
z with diﬀerent weights. The term, exp [−λ(t − ν)], represents these weights,
implying that a more remote past receives a smaller weight in the formation of
households’ perception of tranquility. Thus, λ may be seen as the rate of loss
e
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of relevance or loss of memory of past events. The higher λ, the more quickly
eroded is the relevance of past events.14
Diﬀerentiation of (14) with respect to t yields the following diﬀerential equation:
ż = κ (re − r, α) − λz
(15)
Two dynamic equations (13) and (15),along with the equation describing the
evolution of ﬁrms’ liability structure, (7), are essential building blocks for our
model of long waves. To proceed, we need to see how the rate of return on
equity, re , is determined. re is deﬁned as follows:
re ≡

Div + Γ
(1 − sf )(Π − δpK − rM ) + (v̂ − p̂)vN H
=
H
vN
vN H

(16)

where Γ is capital gains adjusted for inﬂation (Γ ≡ (v̂ − p̂)vN H ).
The rate of return on equity is determined by stock market equilibrium.
Stock market equilibrium requires that the number of shares supplied by ﬁrms
equals that of shares held by households, N = N H , which implies Ṅ = Ṅ H in
terms of the change in the number of shares. Firms issue new shares whenever
retained earnings and bank loans fall short of the funds needed to carry their
investment plans. Thus ﬁrms’ ﬁnance constraint (1) implies that:
Ṅ =

1
[pI + Div + iM − Π − Ṁ ]
v

(17)

Simple algebra shows that capital gains can be expressed as follows:
Γ = (v̂ − p̂)vN H = (α̂ + m̂ + K̂)vN H − v Ṅ H

(18)

14 An alternative speciﬁcation to (13) and (14) is possible. Consider the following speciﬁcation.
α̇ = ζ(α∗ − α)
(13a)
Z t
α∗ =
exp [−λ(t − ν)]κ̄ (rνe − r) dν
(14a)
−∞

where κ̄′ (·) > 0 and α∗ is the desired equity-deposit ratio. (14a) tells us that households’
desired portfolio is determined by the trajectory of the diﬀerence between the rates of return
on equity and deposit. This desired ratio may not be instantaneously attained so that the
adjustment of the actual to the desired ratio takes time. (13a) represents this kind of lagged
adjustment of the actual equity-deposit ratio toward the desired ratio. In spite of diﬀerent
interpretations, the two speciﬁcations, (13)-(14) and (13a)-(14a), are qualitatively similar. To
see this, let z ≡ α∗ − α. Then ż = α̇∗ − α̇. Diﬀerentiating (14a) with respect to t, we have
α̇∗ = κ̄(r e ) − λα∗ = κ̄(re ) − λ(α + z). Therefore, we can rewrite (13a) and (14a) to:
α̇ = ζ(z)

(13b)

ż = κ̄(r ) − λα − ζ(z) − λz

(15a)

e

One may want to compare (13b)-(15a) with (13)-(15).
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(α̂ + m̂ + K̂)vN H represents the total increase in the real value of stock market
wealth15 but some of the increase is attributed to the increase in the number
of shares (= v Ṅ H ). To get the measure of capital gains, the latter should be
deducted from the total increase.
Using N = N H , substituting (20) in (21) and plugging this result in (19),
we get the new expression for re :
re =

Π − iM + Ṁ + (α̂ + m̂ + K̂)vN H − pI
vN H

(19)

Normalizing by pK, we get the expression for re as a function of π, u, m, ṁ, α
and α̇:
re

πuσ − δ − rm + (1 + α)[ṁ + mϕ(u)] + α̇m − ϕ(u)
αm
≡ re (π, u, m, α, ṁ, α̇)

=

(20)
(21)

Substituting this expression in the dynamic equation (15), we have:
ż = κ [re (π, u, m, α, ṁ, α̇) − r, α] − λz

(22)

(22) shows that households’ views of tranquility are aﬀected by a number of
variables and the relationship is complex. We consider several cases according
to the property of (22) in section 3.
2.4. Goods market equilibrium
C
I
Y
The equilibrium condition for the goods market is that K
+K
=K
, and the
deﬁnition of q implies that q = (1 + α)m. Using these, the equilibrium condition
for the goods market can be written as:

c1 [uσ − sf (πuσ − δ − rm)] + c2 (1 + α)m + ϕ(u) + δ = uσ

(23)

We take the proﬁt share (π) as endogenous and the equilibrium value of π can
be found for given u, m and α. Explicitly, we have:
π

ϕ(u) + δ − (1 − c1 )uσ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
c1 sf uσ
≡ π(u, m, α)
=

(24)
(25)

As u, m and α evolve over time, the proﬁt share changes as well. The Harrodian
investment function adopted in this paper emphasizes a high sensitivity of investment to changes in the utilization. Speciﬁcally, it assumes that investment
15 Note

that α̂ + m̂ + K̂ = v̂ + N̂ − p̂.
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rises much faster than saving as the utilization rate changes. This Harrodian
assumption has an implication for the eﬀect of changes in utilization on profitability: utilization has a positive eﬀect on the proﬁt share and the magnitude
will be quantitatively large.16 The large eﬀect of changes in utilization on the
proﬁt share plays an important role in generating short cycles. (See section 4)
It is also readily seen that changes in the debt ratio and the equity-deposit
ratio positively aﬀect the proﬁt share. Increases in the debt ratio or the equitydeposit ratio raise consumption demand though changes in disposable income
or wealth, thereby increases the proﬁt share.17
3. Long Waves
This section shows how endogenous changes in ﬁrms’ and households’ ﬁnancial practices generate long waves. Our model of long waves consists of two
subsystems: one describes changes in ﬁrms’ liability structure and the other
speciﬁes changes in households’ portfolio composition. Section 3.1 analyzes the
evolution of ﬁrms’ liability structure, assuming households’ portfolio composition is frozen. Section 3.2 examines households’ portfolio dynamics, given the
assumption that ﬁrms’ liability structure does not change. Section 3.3 combines
two subsystems and shows how long waves emerge from the interaction between
two subsystems.
3.1. Long-Run Debt Dynamics
This section analyzes the long-run evolution of ﬁrms’ debt structure. For
convenience, I reproduce equation (7).
(ρ )
T
ṁ = τ
where τ ′ (·) > 0
(7)
rm
Regarding the shape of τ in (7), Minsky’s discussion suggests that the prosperity
during tranquil years tends to induce ﬁrms and bankers to gradually raise the
leverage ratio; the rise in the leverage ratio, however, cannot sustain because
it worsens the proﬁt/interest relation. Minsky points out that the ﬁnancial
system is prone to crises as the ratio of proﬁt to interest traverses a critical level
(Minsky, 1995). The resulting systemic crisis may prompt a rapid de-leveraging
process. To capture this idea, we assume that τ ′ (·) takes relatively small positive
ρT
values within a narrow bound when rm
is above a threshold level (good years),
16 If ∂(I/K) = ϕ′ (u) > (1 − c )σ + c s πσ = ∂(S/K) ,
1
1 f
∂u
∂u
17 ∂π = c1 sf r+c2 (1+α) > 0 and ∂π = c2 m > 0
∂m
c1 sf uσ
∂α
c1 sf uσ
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then

∂π
∂u

=

ϕ′ (u)−(1−c1 )σ−c1 sf πσ
c1 sf uσ

> 0.

ρT
whereas it takes relatively large negative values when rm
is below the threshold
level (bad years). When falling proﬁt/interest ratio passes through the threshold
level, ṁ sharply falls reﬂecting a rapid del-everaging process. Thus, τ ′ (·) is likely
ρT
to be very large when rm
= τ −1 (0). Figure 3 reﬂects this assumption.

m
W()

W 1(0)

UT
rm

Figure 3: Debt-Capital Ratio and Proﬁt-Interest Ratio

As brieﬂy discussed in section 2.1.2, we use the trend rate of proﬁt ρT as
a basis of the evolution of ﬁrms’ liability structure. Behind equation (7) is the
idea that ﬁrms’ liability structure evolves endogenously over time and that the
key determinant of the evolution is ﬁrms’ and banks’ perception of tranquility.
The level of ﬁrms’ proﬁt relative to payment commitments on liabilities is an
indicator of ﬁrms’ performance and solvency status. Movements of the proﬁt
rate in general include both trend and cyclical components. It seems reasonable
to assume that the long-run evolution of ﬁrms’ liability structure is primarily
determined by the trend of the proﬁt rate rather than the current proﬁt rate.18
The driving force of the short-run cyclical movements in the current proﬁt
rate is changes in capacity utilization while the desired rate, u∗ , provides a
good approximation of the long-run average of actual rates of utilization. Thus
setting the utilization rate at the desired rate, the short-run cyclical component
18 This perspective is in line with Minsky’s statement that “[T]he inherited debt reﬂects
the history of the economy, which includes a period in the not too distant past in which the
economy did not do well. Acceptable liability structures are based on some margin of safety
so that expected cash ﬂows, even in periods when the economy is not doing well, will cover
contractual debt payments”(Minsky, 1982, 65).
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in the proﬁt rate is eﬀectively eliminated, and we have
ρT

= π(u∗ , m, α)u∗ σ
n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
=
c1 sf

(26)

The trend rate of proﬁt deﬁned as (26) depends positively on the debt-capital
∂ρT
T
ratio m and the equity-deposit ratio α ( ∂ρ
∂m > 0 and ∂α > 0). The proﬁtinterest ratio, the key determinant of the liability structure, is written as
n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
ρT
=
rm
c1 sf rm

(27)

(27) implies that for a given value of α, the proﬁt-interest ratio is uniquely
determined by the debt-capital ratio m. Minsky’s implicit assumption that a
rising debt ratio deteriorates the proﬁt/commitment relation can be written as:
n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c1 sf δ > 0

(28)

The average gross saving rate is typically greater than household marginal
propensity to save out of disposable income, and this condition ensures that (28)
∗
will be met: if YS = YI = n+δ
u∗ σ > (1 − c1 ), then n + δ − (1 − c1 )u σ + c1 sf δ > 0.
Thus, we assume that this condition is satisﬁed.19
Using (7) and (27), ṁ can be written as a function of m and α.
(
)
n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c2 (1 + α)m + c1 sf (δ + rm)
ṁ = τ
≡ F(m, α) (29)
− +
c1 sf rm
(29), along with the condition (28), implies that for any value of α, (i) F is
decreasing in m, (ii) there exists a unique value of the debt ratio m∗ (α) such that
if m = m∗ (α), ṁ = 0, and (iii) m∗ (α) depends positively on α, i.e. m∗′ (α) > 0.
By setting ṁ to zero and solving for m, we obtain the algebraic expression for
m∗ (α):
n + δ − (1 − c1 )u∗ σ + c1 sf δ
m∗ (α) ≡ −1
(30)
[τ (0) − 1]c1 sf r − c2 (1 + α)
It is straightforward from properties (i), (ii) and (iii) that (assuming α constant) our dynamic speciﬁcation of Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis implies that ﬁrms’ debt structure monotonically converges to a stable ﬁxed point
m∗ . The intuition is simple. When the actual debt ratio (m) is lower than
m∗ (α), the corresponding proﬁt-interest ratio is greater than the threshold level
19 Otherwise, an increase in the debt ratio will raise the proﬁt-interest ratio which leads to
a self-repelling process of debt ratio without any ceiling.
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at which the debt ratio does not change. This will induce ﬁrms to raise the
debt ratio. The same kind of event will happen as long as m < m∗ (α): m will
eventually converge to m∗ (α). The opposite will happen when the debt ratio is
greater than the critical level (m > m∗ (α)).
Given assumption (28), a stable dynamics is inevitable in a one-dimensional
continuous time framework. Moving from continuous to discrete time framework may change the picture so that ﬁrms’ debt dynamics alone can produce
long-run cyclical movements. In this paper, however, I explore another avenue
toward long waves by integrating ﬁrms’ debt dynamics into households’ portfolio
dynamics.
3.2. Household Portfolio Dynamics
The other subsystem of our model of long waves, which describes households’
portfolio dynamics, consists of two dynamic equations:
α̇ = ζ(z)

(13)

ż = κ (re − r, α) − λz

(15)

Analogously to the analysis of ﬁrms’ debt dynamics, we are interested in the
long-run evolution of household portfolio decisions and, to simplify the analysis
abstracts from the eﬀect of short-run variations in capacity utilization. The rate
of return on equity evaluated at u = u∗ equals
re |u=u∗ =

ρT (m, α) − δ − rm + (1 + α)[F(m, α) + mn] + ζ(z)m − n
αm

(31)

Given this expression for re , equation (15) becomes
ż = κ (re |u=u∗ − r, α) − λz ≡ G(m, α, z)

(32)

(13), (29), and (32) constitute a three-dimensional dynamical system. To better
understand the mechanics of this three dimensional system, let us take a look
at the subsystem (13) and (32), assuming that m is ﬁxed. By diﬀerentiating
(32) with respect to α and z, the eﬀects of α and z on ż are given by:
Gα = κre

∂re
+ κα S 0
∂α

(33)

∂re
ζ′
− λ = κr e − λ S 0
(34)
∂z
α
The eﬀect of changes in α on z, Gα in (43), is decomposed into two parts. First,
changes in α aﬀect the rate of return on equity, which inﬂuences households’
Gz = κre
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e

e

e ∂r
views on stock markets, κre ∂r
∂α . The eﬀect of an increase in α on r , ∂α , can
be negative or positive in the steady state. Second, an increase in α mitigates
the desire for further increases in equity holdings (κα < 0). Thus, the overall
eﬀect depends on the precise magnitude of these two eﬀects.
The eﬀect of z on ż is also unclear. On the one hand, an increase in households’ optimism about stock markets accelerates stock holdings, which raises
capital gains and the rate of return on equity. The increase in re reinforces
e
their optimism (κre ∂r
∂z > 0). On the other hand, the degree of optimism will
erode at a speed of λ, holding re and α constant. Thus, the net eﬀect is ambiguous.
Let J H be the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the ﬁxed point of (39) and (42).
The ambiguity of the signs of Gα and Gz yields four cases. Table 1 summarizes
it.

Table 1: Classifying Fixed Points
Gz < 0

Gz > 0

Gα < 0

Case I Stable
Tr(JH ) < 0 and Det(JH ) > 0

Case II Unstable
Tr(JH ) > 0 and Det(JH ) > 0

Gα > 0

Case III Saddle
Tr(JH ) < 0 and Det(JH ) < 0

Case IV Saddle
Tr(JH ) > 0 and Det(JH ) < 0

A locally stable steady state in the subsystem is obtained when Gz and Gα
e
∂r e
e
are both negative (Case I). In this case, λ is large relative to κre ∂r
∂z , and κr ∂α
is negative or, if positive, relatively small compared to the absolute value of κα .
Thus, to get a local stable steady state for households’ portfolio dynamics, the
positive eﬀect of changes in α and z on ż via the rate of return on equity needs
to remain relatively small in the neighborhood of the steady state.
e
Moving from Case I, as λ gets smaller than κre ∂r
∂z (Gz > 0), keeping the
condition Gα < 0, the steady state becomes locally unstable, yielding Case II.
In this case, a high optimism further boosts households’ optimistic views on
stock markets, creating destabilizing forces. The locally unstable steady state,
along with nonlinearities of (13) and (32), can produce limit cycles as long as
λ is not too small. Thus, in this case, households’ portfolio dynamics alone can
generate persistent long waves.
e
If Gα > 0, i.e. κre ∂r
∂α is larger than |κα |, then the ﬁxed point of the households’ portfolio dynamics becomes saddle, regardless of the sign of Gz (Case III
and IV). In both Case III and IV, a high level of equity holdings creates increasing optimism (Gα > 0), making the steady state a saddle point. However, Case
18

IV is distinguished from Case III because it is an exceptional case: it turns out
that the destabilizing force in Case IV is too strong to produce a limit cycle for
the three dimensional full system ((13), (29), and (32)), whereas, in all other
three cases I, II, and III, an appropriate choice of parameter values can produce
a limit cycle for the full system. The next section analyzes the full system of
long waves.
3.3. Full Dynamics: Long Waves
We now put together ﬁrms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics and
obtain the following three dimensional dynamical system:
ṁ = F(m, α)

(29)

α̇ = ζ(z)

(13)

ż = G(m, α, z)

(32)

Let us ﬁrst consider the Jacobian matrix of the system evaluated in the steady
state.
 


Fm Fα 0
−
+
0
 


J= 0
(35)
0
ζ′  =  0
0
+ 
Gm Gα Gz
− +/− +/−
Gα and Gz are ambiguously signed but the partial derivative of G with respect
to m is likely to be negative:
Gm = κre
[

where
e

∂ρT
∂m

∂re
∂m

(36)

]
m − ρT + (1 + α)mFm + n + δ

∂r
=
(37)
∂m
αm2
in the steady state. The sign of (37) may appear to be indeterminate: while
∂ρT
∂m m − ρT is negative due to assumption (28) and (1 + α)mFm is negative
since Fm < 0, n + δ is positive. The discussion on the shape of τ (·) in section
3.1, however, suggests that Fm is large in magnitude at the steady state growth
path.20 Thus, at the steady state, the negative terms in the numerator in (37)
dominate, and the rate of return on equity will decrease as ﬁrms’ indebtedness
e
increases in the neighborhood of the steady state. Thus, we have Gm = κre ∂r
∂m <
0.
20 If τ ′ (·) is large at ρT = τ −1 (0), the derivative of F(m, α) with respect to m is strongly
rm
negative at m = m∗ (α), i.e. |Fm | is large. In a limiting case where the de-leveraging process
∗
is instantaneous at m (α), Fm → −∞.
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We are interested in the conditions under which the system exhibits limit
cycle behavior. As 3.1 and 3.2 showed, the speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial
decisions, (29), leads to asymptotically stable dynamics, whereas households’
portfolio dynamics ((13) and (32)) produces several cases in Table 1. Our analytic result suggests that if households’ portfolio dynamics is neither strongly
stabilizing nor strongly destabilizing, our baseline system of (13), (29) and (32)
tends to generate limit cycles. Our analysis of limit cycles is based on the Hopf
bifurcation theorem. The Hopf bifurcation occurs if the nature of the system
experiences the transition from stable ﬁxed point to stable cycle as we gradually
change a parameter value of a dynamical system (Medio, 1992, section 2.7). I
will use λ as the parameter for the analysis of bifurcation.21 Proposition 122
provides the main results of our analysis of long waves:
Proposition 1. Consider the three dimensional system of (12), (29) and (32)
and the Jacobian matrix (35) where the partial derivatives are taken at the steady
state values. Let
√
(|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα ) − (|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα )2 + 4ζ ′ |Fm ||Gm |Fα
<0
b≡
2|Fm |
}
{
′
(I) (Case I and Case II) Suppose that Gz < min |Fm |, ζ|F|Gmα| | 23 and
e

Gα < 0. Then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at λ = λ∗ ≡ κre ∂r
∂z + |b|.
As λ falls passing through λ∗ , the system with a stable steady state loses
its stability, giving rise to a limit cycle.
}
{
z | Fα |Gm |
(II) (Case III) Suppose that Gz < 0 and 0 < Gα < min |Fmζ||G
, |Fm | .
′
e

Then a Hopf bifurcation occurs at λ = λ∗ ≡ κre ∂r
∂z +|b|. As λ falls passing
through λ∗ , the system with a stable steady state loses its stability, giving
rise to a limit cycle.
(III) (Case IV) Suppose that Gα > 0 and Gz > 0. Then the steady state is
unstable. There exists no limit cycle by way of Hopf bifurcation.
Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the existence of a limit cycle requires at least three conditions: ﬁrst, the mitigation eﬀect of a high proportion
21 λ is particularly useful for the analysis not only because it is of obvious behavioral importance but also because it provides analytic tractability due to the fact that changes in λ
do not aﬀect steady state values.
22 The proof of Proposition I is found in Appendix A but the proof is concerned about only
the existence of a limit cycle. The computation of the coeﬃcient that shows whether the
limit cycle is stable is very complicated and hard to interpret. Therefore, we extensively use
simulation exercises to observe the stability of cycles.
23 Note that Case I automatically satisﬁes the second condition since G < 0 in Case I.
z
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Figure 4: A Limit Cycle in the Model of Long Waves

of equity holdings on increasing optimism (|κα |) is suﬃciently large so that
Gα < 024 ; second, households’ optimistic{ or pessimistic
} view on stock markets
′
is not excessively persistent (Gz < min |Fm |, ζ|F|Gmα| | ); third, the rate of loss

of relevance of past events (λ) should not be too large (λ < λ∗ ).25 The second
and third conditions imply that for the existence of a limit cycle, λ should be
of appropriate magnitude:
{
}
ζ ′ |Gα |
∂re
∂re
− min |Fm |,
< λ < κr e
+ |b|
(38)
κr e
∂z
|Fm |
∂z
All of these conditions imply that to get a limit cycle, households’ portfolio
dynamics should be neither strongly stabilizing nor strongly destabilizing.
One interesting aspect of Part (I) in Proposition I is that the interaction
between two stable subsystems - ﬁrms’ debt and households’ portfolio dynamics
- can generate an unstable steady state and a limit cycle (Case I). Thus, in this
case, the source of the resulting long waves lies purely in the interaction between
both ﬁrm and household sectors. Figure 4 depicts the emergence of a limit cycle
24 Or the positive eﬀect of changes in α on ż via its eﬀect on the rate of return on equity
should not be too large.
25 If λ exceeds λ∗ , then the system will be stabilized.
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in this case in a three dimensional space. Figure 5 shows the trajectories of the
debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio in this case.26
(a) Debt-Capital Ratio: Firrms

(b) Equity-Deposit Ratio: Households
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Figure 5: Long Waves

The debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio steadily increase during
a long boom.27 This expansion, however, is followed by a sharp fall in m and
α, which have signiﬁcant negative impacts on eﬀective demand and trigger an
abrupt downturn in the real sector (See section 4 below).
Part (I) also covers Case II where the subsystem of households’ portfolio
dynamics is unstable. As shown in 3.2, in Case II, portfolio dynamics alone
can create a limit cycle. Part (I) in the proposition suggests that the system
can still have a limit cycle when the portfolio dynamics is combined with ﬁrms’
debt dynamics. Then what is the implication of introducing the debt dynamics
into portfolio dynamics? The qualitative analysis does not tell much about
the answer to this question. Numerical experiments, however, provide a case
in which the amplitude and period of long waves get signiﬁcantly larger as we
26 The functions and parameter values for this simulation, which are also used for the simulation in section 5, are found in Appendix B. A suﬃciently long period of time (from t = 0
to t = 30000) is taken in all simulation exercises in this paper.
27 Figure 5 (b) shows the steady increase in the equity-deposit ratio during a long expansion.
This implies that ﬁrms’ debt/equity ratio steadily falls during a expansion (Note that ﬁrms’
stock of debt is always equal to household deposits in this model. Thus, ﬁrms’ debt/equity
ratio is given by 1/α.). Minsky often uses the debt/equity ratio to refer to the degree of
indebtedness. The result in this paper, however, shows that rising indebtedness, measured
by the debt-capital ratio (m), is consistent with falling debt-equity ratio (1/α). Interestingly,
Lavoie and Seccareccia (2001) question the empirical relevance of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis based on their ﬁnding that the debt-equity ratio is not procyclical. The
result of this paper suggests that Minsky’s Instability Hypothesis does not necessarily imply
the procyclical movement of debt-equity ratio.
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move from the 2D subsystem of portfolio dynamics to the full 3D system.
Part (II) in the proposition concerns Case III where the household portfolio
subsystem yields a saddle point steady state. Thus, this part of Proposition 1
shows how stabilizing debt dynamics and households’ portfolio dynamics with
saddle property are combined to produce a limit cycle. Not surprisingly, not
all saddle cases can generate a limit cycle. First, the destabilizing eﬀect that
makes the ﬁxed point in the 2D household
subsystem saddle
− the magnitude
{
}
z | Fα |Gm |
of Gα − should be mild: Gα < min |Fmζ||G
,
.
Second,
Gz should
′
|Fm |
be negative. If it is positive (Gz > 0), the condition for the saddle point,
Gα > 0, eliminates the possibility of the emergence of a limit cycle a la the Hopf
bifurcation. Proposition 1-(III) makes this point. Intuitively, if both Gα > 0 and
Gz > 0 (Case IV), the portfolio dynamics in the household sector is excessively
destabilizing in the sense that stabilizing forces in ﬁrms’ debt dynamics cannot
contain such a strong destabilizing eﬀect.
UT
rm
B

Ɏ

A
-1(0)
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m

Figure 6: The relationship between the debt-capital ratio and the proﬁt-interest
ratio

To understand the mechanism behind the long waves, it is illuminating to
compare the full system with the subsystem of debt dynamics. As seen in section
3.1, with households’ portfolio composition (α) ﬁxed, the debt-capital ratio (m)
monotonically converges to its steady state value m∗ (α). The main reason for
ρT
this convergence was the inverse relation between m and rm
: a rising debtcapital ratio deteriorates ﬁrms’ proﬁt-interest ratio for any given α. However,
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once households’ portfolio composition evolves endogenously, this kind of strict
ρT
inverse relationship breaks down because changes in α also aﬀect rm
.
Figure 6 illustrates this point, where the horizontal dotted line represents
the threshold level (= τ −1 (0)) of the proﬁt-interest ratio that makes ṁ zero. In
the area above the horizontal line, the debt-capital ratio increases and in the
area below the line, it decreases. With α held ﬁxed, the movement along the
curve AB is not possible since for any given α, a rise in m is incompatible with
ρT
a rise in rm
. However, increases in α fueled by households’ optimism during an
expansion have a positive eﬀect on the proﬁt-interest ratio by raising aggregate
demand. Thus, from A to B, the economy experiences increases in both α and
m.28 However, households’ optimistic views on stock markets eventually fade
as both m and α increase. As a result, the negative eﬀect of a rise in the debt
ratio starts to be dominant at some point and the proﬁt-interest ratio begins
falling (point B). Because the proﬁt-interest ratio is still above the threshold
level, the debt ratio keeps increasing and the proﬁt-interest ratio falls along
the curve BC. When the proﬁt-interest ratio passes through point C, the debtcapital ratio starts to fall. When the economy reaches point A, a new cycle
begins.
Figure 7 depicts the same story from a slightly diﬀerent angle. The solid
line plots a trajectory of the actual debt-capital ratio over time and the dotted
line a trajectory of the desired debt ratio (m∗ ≡ m∗ (α) in (30)). For a given
value of α, the debt dynamics, (29), implies that the actual debt ratio m tends
to gravitate toward the desired ratio m∗ (α). However, when α changes, the
desired ratio becomes a moving target of the actual ratio. From this view, a
period of expansion (contraction) is the time when the actual ratio is below
(above) the desired ratio, i.e. m < m∗ (m > m∗ ) and consequently the actual
debt ratio is increasing (decreasing). In words, a stock market boom (rising α)
tends to raise the tolerable level of the debt-capital ratio which the actual ratio
is chasing. When the relation between m and m∗ is reversed, a long downturn
begins (See point C in Figure 7).
4. A Model of Short Cycles
The model of long waves in section 3.3 can be combined with a model of
short cycles. In our analysis of long waves, the degree of capacity utilization
is set at its long run average. However, when it comes to short cycles, the
28 The positive eﬀect of the rise in α on the proﬁt-interest ratio dominates the negative eﬀect
of the rise in m and consequently the proﬁt-interest ratio also increases during this period.
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Actual and Desired Debt Ratios

utilization rate can deviate from the desired rate due to falsiﬁed demand expectations and slow adjustment of capital stocks. Thus, we use equation (9) for our
analysis of short cycles. In 2.4, using this accumulation function (9) and the
consumption function (12), we derived the proﬁt share that ensures the goods
market equilibrium, which depends positively on u, m, and α. (See (24))
Regarding ﬁrms’ pricing/output decisions, this paper adopts a Marshallian
approach elaborated in Skott (1989). The Keynesian literature often assumes
that prices are sticky while output adjusts instantaneously and costlessly to
absorb demand shocks but the Marshallian approach assumes the opposite.
Output does not adjust instantaneously due to a production lag and substantial
adjustment costs.29 In this framework, fast adjustments in prices and the proﬁt
share establish product market equilibrium for a given level of output. In a
continuous-time setting, sluggish output adjustment can be approximated by
assuming that output is predetermined at each moment and that ﬁrms choose
the rate of growth of output, rather than the level of output. Then output
growth is determined by comparing the costs and beneﬁts involved in the output
29 For instance, increases in production and employment require substantial search, hiring
and training costs. Hiring or layout costs include not only explicit costs but also hidden costs
such as a deterioration in industrial relations and morale.
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adjustment which in turn are determined by the labor market conditions and
the proﬁt signal in the goods market, respectively. Thus we can formulate:
Ŷ = h(π, e); hπ > 0, he < 0

(39)

where e is the employment rate. A higher proﬁtability induces ﬁrms to expand
output more rapidly whereas the tightened labor market gives ﬁrms negative
incentives to expand production.30 Assuming a ﬁxed-coeﬃcient Leontief technology, Y = min{σK, νL}, the employment rate can be expressed as: e = YL̄/ν ,
where ν is constant labor productivity and L̄ is available labor force which
exponentially grows at a constant natural rate n. From this deﬁnition,
ê = Ŷ − n

(40)

û = Ŷ − K̂

(41)

The deﬁnition of u yields:

Putting together (9), (24), (39), (40) and (41), we get the following system of
short cycles.
û = h(π(u, m, α), e ) − ϕ(u)
(42)
+ + +

−

+

ê = h(π(u, m, α), e ) − n
+ + +

−

(43)

When m and α are ﬁxed, the system of (42) and (43) exhibits essentially the
same dynamic properties as Skott (1989). As Skott shows, under plausible
assumptions, the system of (42) and (43) ensures the existence of a steady
growth equilibrium and the steady state is locally asymptotically unstable unless
the negative eﬀect of employment on output expansion is implausibly large.
Once the boundedness of the trajectories is proved, the system (42) and (43)
will generate a limit cycle a la the Poincare-Bendixson theorem (See Skott 1989,
Appendix 6C for the proof).
5. Putting all together: Long Waves and Short Cycles
This section puts all elements together in order to integrate long waves with
short cycles and presents our simulation results.31 Our full model of long waves
and short cycles is a ﬁve dimensional dynamical system that consists of (12),
30 For

more details about the behavioral foundation of (39), see Skott (1989, Ch.4).
values and functions used for this simulation are available in Appendix B. The
simulation in this section is based on Case I in Table 1. Simulation results in other cases are
available upon request.
31 Parameter
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(29), (32), (42), and (43). We have seen that (12), (29), and (32) provide a model
of long waves, whereas (42) and (43) generate a mechanism of short cycles.32
(a) Short Cycles without Long-Run Dynamics

(b) Long Waves and Short Cycles

S

S

B

m,D fixed

Long Expansion

Downturn
A

e

Figure 8: Comparison

As seen in section 4, if m and α are ﬁxed, (42) and (43) produce a limit
cycle under plausible conditions. It can be shown that the resulting limit cycle
exhibits a clockwise movement on the e-u space, or alternatively, the e-π space.
Figure 8 (a) presents an example of the limit cycle on the e-π space. The system of (12), (29) and (32), however, generates long waves of the debt-capital
ratio (m) and the equity-deposit ratio (α), which are represented in Figure 5.
As m and α change endogenously, the limit cycle in Figure 8 (a) breaks down
and the clockwise movement of e and π spirals up to the northeast or down
to the southwest, depending on the direction of changes in m and α. Figure 8
(b) illustrates this. The upward spiral from A to B represents a long expansion driven by increases in the debt-capital ratio and the equity-deposit ratio,
whereas the downward spiral from B to A an economic downturn prompted by
sharp decreases in m and α.
During each long expansion, the proﬁt share exhibits a strong upward movement with mild cyclical ﬂuctuations around the trend (Figure 9 (a)). The similar
32 By using (26) as our deﬁnition of trend proﬁtability based on u = u∗ , the system of long
waves becomes independent of that of short cycles, while the latter depends on the former.
This kind of unilateral dependence can be relaxed by adopting an alternative formulation
of trend proﬁtability, without aﬀecting the qualitative results. For instance, we can use a
weighted moving average of current proﬁt rates as a measure of the trend rate of proﬁt (See
Appendix C).
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Figure 9: Simulation Paths I

pattern characterizes the movements in the proﬁt rates (Figure 9 (b)). During
crises, the rate of proﬁt net of depreciation and interest payment (πuσ − δ − rm)
tumbles even to negative rates. A change in the debt structure have large impacts on the real sector performance through its eﬀect on the proﬁtability. This
is prominently shown in the behavior of the employment rate (Figure 9 (c)).
Figure 9 (d) depicts a trajectory of the rate of return on equity. During long
booms, the rate of return on equity is strong and sound on average but during
crises, it suddenly drops to signiﬁcantly negative rates.
Figure 10 (b) shows the growth rate of output where the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁltered trend is added.33 A ﬁnancial sector induced crisis triggers a deep recession in the real sector which is reﬂected in the negative growth rates during
33 The ﬁltered series is only for illustrative purpose since it simply smoothes the original
series and it does not adequately capture asymmetric features and structural breaks in the
original series.
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Figure 10: Simulation Paths II

periodic deep downturns. Capacity utilization and capital accumulation follow
the pattern similar to that of output growth(Figure 10 (a) and (c)). Figure
10 (d), ﬁnally, plot the ratio of consumption to household income. The series
follows the basic long waves/short cycles patten as shown in the proﬁt share
and the employment rate but the movement in the consumption/income ratio
is noticeably smooth compared to other simulated series.34
6. Conclusion
The U.S. economy is going through a deep recession triggered by the biggest
ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depression. A Minskian perspective suggests
34 The

long run behavior of consumption is closely related to the movement in house-

hold net worth to income ratio:

C
YH

=

c1 Y H +c2 N W H
YH

(1+α)m
.
uσ−sf (πuσ−δ−rm)
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H

= c1 + c2 NYWH

where

NW H
YH

=

that the explanation of this crisis should be found in endogenous changes in
ﬁnancial fragility.
This study has modeled a Minskian theory of long waves. The model clariﬁes
the underlying mechanism of endogenous changes in ﬁnancial fragility and the
interaction between real and ﬁnancial sectors. At a theoretical level, the study
provides a promising way of integrating two types of instability principles: Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis and Harrod’s Instability Principle. While
both principles provide a source of cycles, they have distinct frequencies and
amplitudes in this model. The Minskian instability hypothesis creates long
waves and the Harrodian instability principle produces short cycles. The limit
to the upward trend created by Minskian instability is imposed by ﬁnancial crisis, while explosive trajectories implied by Harrodian instability are contained
by stabilizing labor market dynamics.35 When two principles are combined into
a coherent stock-ﬂow consistent framework, the proposed pattern of long waves
and short cycles emerges.
A purely mathematical model of this kind may clarify the logic of interactions
but clearly has many limitations. The depth of the current crisis and the time
needed to initiate a new cycle depend on institutional and policy dimensions.
Minsky devotes a large part of his analysis to the institutional and historical
developments of ﬁnancial markets and policy responses. Thus, the patterns of
long waves are heavily aﬀected by these elements. The full account of long waves
and crises is possible only when one takes a serious look at these dimensions.
Disregarding the historical contingencies of actual movements, it may be
useful to extend the model in a number of directions. First, it may be desirable
to explicitly treat the banking sector as an active proﬁt-seeking unit. Bankers’
perception of tranquility, possibly aﬀected by their own proﬁtability, may not
always agree with those of the ﬁrm and household sectors.36 Next, this paper
did not explore the implications of households’ indebtedness. Instead, it has
focused on an increasing share of stocks (riskier asset) in households’ ﬁnancial
wealth as an indicator of increasing fragility in the household sector. It would
be interesting to see the eﬀect of the introduction of the evolution of household
35 The following quote from Minsky (1995, 84) is suggestive: “As reasonable values of the
parameters of the endogenous interactions lead to an explosive endogenous process, and as
explosive expansions and contractions rarely occur, then constraints by devices such as the
relative inelasticity of ﬁnance or an inelastic labor supply need to be imposed and be eﬀective
in generating what actually happens.”
36 Setterﬁeld (2004) assumes that the private sector (the aggregate of ﬁrm and household
sectors) and the banking sector have diﬀerent fragility functions but does not try to justify
the assumed shapes of those functions.
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debt into the model.37 Third, the proposed model is inﬂation neutral in the
sense that the decisions on real quantities such as investment, consumption and
output expansion are made with no reference to inﬂation and the banking sector
holds the real interest rate at a constant level. In some account of Minskian ideas
(e.g see Fazzari et al., 2008), changes in the inﬂation rate play an important
role. Finally, the assumption of a closed economy in this paper is another major
limitation. Unfettered international capital ﬂows, in contrast to the belief of
its proponents, have created growing instability and global imbalances (Blecker,
1999). Several authors suggest that Minsky’s theory can be extended to an
international context (e.g. Wolfson, 2002), but few attempt has been made to
formalize the ideas and to propose precise mechanisms behind them. Addressing
these issues is left for future research.
37 To introduce this aspect, the model may have to be extended to allow heterogeneity among
households as long as the household sector as a whole is in a net credit position.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
To prove the existence of a limit cycle for the system of (12), (29), and (32),
we need to show that the Jacobian matrix (35) evaluated at (m(λ), α(λ), z(λ),
λ), where (m(λ), α(λ), z(λ)) is a ﬁxed point of the system,38 should have the
following properties:
• The Jacobian matrix has a pair of complex conjugate eigenvalues β(λ) ±
θ(λ)i such that β(λ∗ ) = 0, θ(λ∗ ) ̸= 0, and β ′ (λ∗ ) ̸= 0 and no other
eigenvalues with zero real part exist at (m(λ∗ ), α(λ∗ ), z(λ∗ ) , λ∗ )
where λ∗ is a Hopf bifurcation point.
To apply the above condition for the Hopf bifurcation to the current context,
I will use the fact that the Jacobian matrix will have a negative real root and a
pair of pure imaginary roots if and only if:
(R1) Tr(J) = Fm + Gz < 0
(R2) J1 + J2 + J3 = Fm Gz − ζ ′ · Gα > 0
(R3) Det(J) = −ζ ′ · (Fm Gα − Fα Gm ) < 0
(R4) −Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3 ) + Det(J) = −(Fm + Gz )(Fm Gz − ζ ′ · Gα ) − ζ ′ ·
(Fm Gα − Fα Gm ) = 0
Let us denote the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix as µ(λ) and β(λ)±θ(λ)i.
Proof of (I). Suppose that Gα < 0. Then (R3) is{always met.} In order
′
to satisfy (R1) and (R2), we should have Gz < min |Fm |, ζ|F|Gmα| | . (R4) is
quadratic in Gz . (R4) can be rewritten as:
a1 G2z + a2 Gz + a3 = 0

(A1)

where
a1

≡

−Fm > 0

a2

≡ −(F2m − ζ ′ Gα ) S 0

a3

≡ ζ ′ Fα Gm < 0

Solving (A1) for Gz , we obtain one negative and one positive real roots. Let
us select the negative root39 , which is given as:
38 Note
39 It

that in our case the ﬁxed point is independent of the value of λ.
can be shown that the positive root is irrelevant for the analysis.
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b≡

(|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα ) −

√
(|Fm |2 − ζ ′ Gα )2 + 4ζ ′ |Fm ||Gm |Fα
<0
2|Fm |

e

(A2)

e

∂r
e
Since Gz = κre ∂r
∂z −λ, the value of λ that satisﬁes (R4)
{ is: λ = κr} ∂z +|b|. Let
′

ζ |Gα |
and λ = λ∗ ,
λ∗ ≡ κre ∂r
∂z + |b|. We have shown that if Gz < min |Fm |, |Fm |
then the Jacobian matrix has a negative real root and a pair of imaginary roots:
µ(λ∗ ) < 0, β(λ∗ ) = 0, and θ(λ∗ ) ̸= 0. To prove λ∗ is indeed the bifurcation
point, we still need to show that β ′ (λ∗ ) ̸= 0. To prove β ′ (λ∗ ) ̸= 0, let us use the
following fact:
e

µ(λ) + 2β(λ) = Fm + Gz
2µ(λ)β(λ) + β(λ)2 + θ(λ)2 = Fm Gz − ζ ′ · Gα
µ(λ)[β(λ)2 + θ(λ)2 ] = −ζ ′ · (Fm Gα − Fα Gm )
Totally diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to λ, we get


 

1
2
0
µ′ (λ)
−1


 

2β(λ)
2[µ(λ) + β(λ)]
2θ(λ)  β ′ (λ) = |Fm |

[β(λ)2 + θ(λ)2 ]
2µ(λ)β(λ)
2µ(λ)θ(λ)
θ′ (λ)
0

(A3)

z
The right hand side of (A3) is obtained using the fact that ∂G
∂λ = −1 and λ
does not aﬀect all other partial derivatives than Gz . Evaluating (A3) at λ = λ∗ ,
we have:

 


1
2
0
µ′ (λ∗ )
−1


 

2µ(λ∗ )
2θ(λ∗ )  β ′ (λ∗ ) = |Fm |
 0
θ(λ∗ )2
0
2µ(λ∗ )θ(λ∗ )
θ′ (λ∗ )
0

Solving this for β ′ (λ∗ ), we ﬁnally get:
β ′ (λ∗ ) =

2µ(λ∗ )θ(λ∗ )|Fm | − 2θ(λ∗ )3
< 0 since µ(λ∗ ) < 0
4µ(λ∗ )2 θ(λ∗ ) + 4θ(λ∗ )3

Thus, β ′ (λ∗ ) is strictly negative.
Proof of (II). Suppose that Gα > 0 and Gz < 0.
{ Then (R1) is }always
z | Fα |Gm |
, |Fm | . The
satisﬁed. To meet (R2) and (R3), we need Gα < min |Fmζ||G
′
rest of the proof is essentially the same as that of (I).
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Proof of (III). Routh-Hurwitz necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the local
stability of a three dimensional system are (R1), (R2) and (R3) with replacing
the equality in (R4) by the inequality: −Tr(J)(J1 + J2 + J3 ) + Det(J) > 0.
Suppose that Gα > 0 and Gz > 0. Then (R2) is always violated and the ﬁxed
point is unstable. At the same time, since (R2) is not met, it is impossible to
get a limit cycle a la the Hopf bifurcation.
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Appendix B: Functions and Parameter Values in Simulation

Ŷ = h(π, e) = h0 +
ṁ = τ

(ρ )
T

rm

g = γ0 + γ1 u

(B1)

I
=g+δ
K

(B2)

h1
1 + exp[−h2 (π + h3 ln(h4 − e) + h5 ))]

(B3)

τ1 − τ0
( ρT
)
1 + exp[−τ2 rm
− τ3 ]

(B4)

= τ0 +

where ρT = π(u∗ , m, α)u∗ σ and u∗ =
α̇ = ζ(z) = ζ0 +

1
(n − γ0 )
γ1

ζ1 − ζ0
1 + exp[−ζ2 (z − ζ3 )]

(B5)

ż = κ (re |u=u∗ − r, α) − λz = κ0 + κ1 (re |u=u∗ − r) − κ2 α − λz
where re |u=u∗ =

(B6)

ρT − δ − rm + (1 + α)(ṁ + mn) + α̇m − n
.
αm

Table 2: Parameter Values

γ0

γ1

h0

h1

h2

h3

h4

h5

σ

-0.93

1.2

-0.02

0.07

50

0.4

1.1

0.423

0.5

n

δ

sf

r

c1

c2

κ0

κ1

κ2

0.03

0.09

0.7

0.03

0.65

0.04

0.093

0.03

0.08

λ

ζ0

ζ1

ζ2

ζ3

τ0

τ1

τ2

τ3

0.04

-0.24

0.03

30

-0.069

-0.135

0.01

20

10.4

Appendix C: Alternative Measure of the Trend Rate of Proﬁt
A weighed moving average speciﬁcation may provide an alternative measure
of the trend rate of proﬁt:
∫
ρT =

t

−∞

η exp [−η(t − ν)]ρν dν where µ > 0

(C1)

where ρν is the current rate of proﬁt at each moment of time ν ∈ (−∞, t] and
η exp [−η(t − ν)] represents the weight attached to ρν in the calculation of the
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trend rate of proﬁt at time t, which exponetially decreases as ν gets futhur back
to the past. This speciﬁcation implies that the trend proﬁt rate is constantly
updated based on the following averaging process.
ρ̇T = η(ρ − ρT )
where ρ = π(u, m, α)uσ. Note that the expression for the current proﬁt rate ρ
includes capicity utilization (u) as well as the debt ratio (m) and the equitydeposit ratio (α). Thus, the system of short cycles and that of long waves
become interdependent.
The two speciﬁcations, (26) and (C1), produce qualitatively similar results.
The basic idea behind both speciﬁcations is to smooth actual proﬁtability and
get a measure of the long-run trend of proﬁtability and one would expect the
two speciﬁcations to produce qualitatively similar results. Simulations conﬁrm
that this is indeed the case (Simulation results based on (C1) is available upon
request.) Analytically, the speciﬁcation (26) is more tractable and the analysis
in this paper has been based on (26).

40

